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The role of ‘zero-responders’ during 7/7: Implications for the 
Emergency Services  
Introduction:  
The July 7
th
 2005 London bombings (known as 7/7) generated much media coverage and 
scrutiny of the subsequent response by the emergency services, leading to a debate about what 
the public can reasonably expect from first responders in such situations. For instance, it has 
been argued that accusations of fire-fighters not responding quickly enough to enter the tunnels 
where the explosions happened were misplaced
1
. Indeed the official enquiry into 7/7 (Hallett, 
2011) concluded that that no one who died could have been saved had they been reached quicker 
by emergency services, thus countering possible accusations that they should have responded 
differently. However, this debate highlights a possible issue for the emergency services. The time 
taken to reach some survivors illustrates that in the immediate aftermath of mass emergencies, 
survivors may be responsible for providing assistance to each other until outside help arrives, as no 
response is ever instantaneous, and there is always a delay before first responders arrive (Cole et al., 
2011). Existing research into various mass emergencies (e.g. Drury & Cocking, 2007, Drury et al. 
2009a), and 7/7 itself (Drury et al. 2009b) has found evidence for spontaneous co-operation amongst 
survivors, and this paper will explore the psychological processes behind such behaviour in more 
detail.  More specifically, it will look at how those directly affected by the 7/7 bombings reacted 
before emergency responders arrived, and the possible implications this can have for how the 
emergency services respond to such incidents.  
The myth of ‘mass panic’  
The study of emergency planning and response has been hindered by pervasive 
misunderstandings of human behaviour in mass emergencies, and how it is often 
misrepresented
2
. Such misunderstandings have their roots in early psychological approaches to 
crowd behaviour. For instance, Le Bon (1968) argued that crowds were an inherent threat to 
those in authority because of their propensity for ‘irrational’ and violent behaviour. This 
irrationalist perspective influenced the ‘panic model’- an amalgam of approaches to emergency 
behaviour that assumed vulnerable public responses during emergencies. For instance, when 
faced with a threat, people would become over-emotional and react disproportionately (Smelser, 
1962), and the greater the perceived threat, the more extreme the emotional behaviour. Collective 
identities would then break down, as people displayed selfish behaviours in an effort to escape 
(Strauss, 1944; Schultz, 1964), and such selfish acts would spread quickly to the crowd as a 
whole by a process of behavioural contagion (McDougall, 1920). 
However, the notion that crowds are prone to ‘irrational mass panic’ during emergencies has 
been largely discredited by subsequent research (e.g. Canter, 1990; Keating, 1982; Sime, 1990). 
Indeed, the US based Disaster Research Center
3
 has an archive detailing over 50 years of 
research into mass emergencies, suggesting that people cope with disasters and emergencies 
remarkably well and are often much more resilient than is predicted by the panic model. 
                                                          
1
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_9464000/9464186.stm  
2 http://dontpaniccorrectingmythsaboutthecrowd.blogspot.co.uk/  
3 http://www.udel.edu/DRC/E.L.%20Quarantelli%20Resource%20Collection/Publications.html 
2 
 
Quarantelli (2001) even questions whether ‘panic’ itself is a useful term, because it does not 
describe accurately how people actually behave in emergencies. 
Nevertheless, the panic model is still common in popular coverage of disasters (e.g. Dynes, 
2003; Fahy et al., 2011; Tierney et al., 2006) and Furedi (2008) argues there is a possible 
contradiction in governmental security policies, as while the emphasis is on promoting resilience 
during emergencies, the premises underpinning such policies often assume the vulnerability of 
those affected. Recent research (Drury, et al., In Press) suggests that some aspects of the 
vulnerability perspective are still held by those responsible for emergency crowd management, 
and the Hillsborough Independent Panel (2012) report of the 1989 stadium disaster supports this 
notion. It concluded that Liverpool fans were not responsible for the tragedy, and instead blamed 
it on a catalogue of mistakes by South Yorkshire Police and Sheffield Wednesday Football Club, 
underpinned by an approach that treated policing at football matches as a public order, rather 
than public safety issue.  
Bystander apathy or intervention? 
Another popular misconception of emergency behaviour is that of bystander apathy, which again 
draws from early social-psychological perspectives. It suggests that bystanders in a crowd may 
avoid helping others in need via a process of diffusion of personal responsibility, and the larger 
the number of bystanders, the greater the chance of inaction. The bystander effect was developed 
by Latané & Darley (1970) as a way of explaining a horrific murder in 1964, where a young 
woman (Kitty Genovese) was killed in a crowded housing complex in New York, US, and her 
neighbours allegedly witnessed the attack but did not intervene. Detailed exploration of this case 
(e.g. Manning et al., 2007) has found that many of the assumptions of the bystander effect are 
not supported by the evidence, but it has still become a ‘modern parable’ within popular 
psychological discourse. The bystander effect is also used to explain inaction in emergencies, 
with some media coverage of 7/7 contrasting the actions of ‘brave’ individuals with the apathetic 
crowd as a whole
4
. However, subsequent research into bystander intervention (e.g. Levine et al., 
2005; Levine & Crowther, 2008) has found that group size does not necessarily increase the 
chances of bystander apathy, and helping others increases when there is a shared sense of social 
identity. Therefore, rather than concluding that people are prone to inaction in emergencies, a 
more socially useful perspective could be to consider in what circumstances helping others could 
be enhanced.  
Implications of assuming crowd vulnerability in emergencies: 
(Manning et al., 2007) argue that crowds are often considered either an active or passive threat, 
as they could encourage irrationality or inaction. This leads to populist representations of crowds 
in emergencies to conclude that they are problematic either because of their propensity for 
‘panic’, or that survivors may be too shocked to co-operate with each other, and so will need 
direction from outside responders. Maintaining such perspectives can have direct implications 
for emergency planning and response. For instance, if planners assume shock or mass panic will 
be the dominant response, then they may discount the possibility that survivors will co-operate 
with each other. However, it has been argued (e.g. Furedi 2008; Wessely, 2005a&b) that 
implementing paternalistic responses could actually stifle any endogenous resilience that the 
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public has, thus encouraging more passivity. There is also a popular misconception that ‘panic’ 
can cause fatalities in emergencies, in that if people become aware of an imminent threat, they 
will stampede to escape. However, Mawson (2005) argues that people are more likely to delay 
action while they seek out more information and/or attachment figures. There is even evidence 
that providing information about threats actually enables people to act effectively to escape 
danger more quickly (Glass & Schoch-Spana, 2002; Proulx & Sime, 1991), suggesting that 
rather than ‘panic’, a resilient response is more likely.  
Crowd resilience- the social identity model  
Alternative perspectives have developed since the panic model that reject its assumptions of 
vulnerability and argue instead for a more resilient approach to crowd responses in emergencies 
(e.g. Johnson, 1988; Mawson, 2005).  They argue that social ties rarely break down, and people 
will co-operate with others where this is possible. More recently, the Social Identity Model of 
Collective Resilience (or SIMCR- Drury et al., 2009a & b; Williams & Drury, 2010) has 
developed this point by proposing that disasters may actually create social bonds between people 
who previously had minimal connections with each other. This explains why people often co-
operate to help strangers in emergencies, and has led to the term ‘Community of Circumstance’ 
(Settle, n.d.) being adopted in UK Cabinet Office emergency planning guidelines to describe this 
phenomenon. The SIMCR draws from the principles of Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) 
(Turner et al., 1987), a broadly based social psychological approach which explains human 
behaviour in terms of self and group categorisation processes. One of its principles is that we 
categorize ourselves via a range of different identities (ranging on a continuum from the personal 
to the more collective), and such identities become more or less salient depending on the social 
context. If a shared collective experience becomes salient, then we begin to self-categorize with 
similar others, and so a shared sense of identity develops. Evidence for this sense of shared 
identity was initially gathered from studies of crowd disorder (e.g. Drury & Reicher, 1999; 
Reicher, 2001) but more recent research (e.g. Cocking et al., 2009; Drury et al., 2009a&b) has 
found that mass emergencies and disasters can create a common identity through a sense of 
shared fate (e.g. ‘we’re all in this together’) whereby people identify with others they may not 
necessarily know or even personally like. 
SCT proposes that once a shared identity develops amongst group members, the following 
psychological processes emerge. First, a shared social identity encourages trust and the 
expectation that others will be supportive (Drury & Reicher, 1999). Second, this identity creates 
a shared definition of social reality (Haslam et al., 1998), which allows collective co-operation. 
Finally, a shared social identity encourages solidarity through the mundane acts that promote 
general social cohesion (Reicher & Haslam, 2010) and through helping others (Levine et al., 
2005). A shared social identity can develop from an existing group membership, but it can also 
arise within an emergency itself through the perception of a ‘common fate’  which brings 
survivors psychologically closer together (Drury et al., 2009a), and can be temporarily stronger 
than existing group memberships (especially if it develops out of the necessity for group 
survival). This new shared identity can endure after the event, as fellow survivors provide mutual 
support to protect each other from trauma (Williams & Drury, 2009). 
Theoretical Rationale:  
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The SIMCR describes well the general co-operation found in mass emergencies, and is supported 
by evidence from sociological studies of mass emergencies (e.g. Fritz, 1996; Solnit, 2009). 
However, recent studies in this area (e.g. Cocking et al., 2009; Drury et al., 2009a&b) tended to 
focus on the frequency of co-operative behaviours and the existence of a shared common identity 
during emergencies, resulting in less focus on how such identities form, and the social influence 
processes involved. A vulnerability framework may assume that crowds could respond to a 
perceived threat in two possible ways. Firstly, there is the assumption that crowds are prone to 
‘panic’ if exposed to danger. However, the vulnerability framework could also assume that 
people may be so stunned during emergencies that they are prone to apathy (as suggested by the 
bystander effect) and will delay action until they receive direction from professional responders.  
There is less evidence to confirm or deny this second assumption. Chertkoff & Kushigian (1999) 
have suggested that during uncertain or confusing situations, people look to others for guidance, 
and so there could be some ad hoc social influence in emergencies, but this has yet to be 
explored in sufficient detail. More recently, Cole et al. (2011) looked at the individual and 
logistical factors that may encourage ‘zero-responders’ (a term used to differentiate between 
spontaneous helpers and professional 1
st
 responders) to emerge from amongst survivors (such as 
training in first aid, availability of medical kits etc), but greater understanding of the collective 
psychological processes involved would be a useful addition to knowledge in this area.  
Therefore, this paper describes a study which explores identification and social influence 
processes in emergency crowds, and the collective psychological processes involved that can 
encourage mutual co-operation amongst survivors. Existing research has investigated either a 
broad range of different incidents (e.g. Drury et al., 2009a), or focussed on the same emergency 
(Drury et al., 2009b), and have provided evidence for the general psychological processes 
involved. However, social influence processes amongst survivors (particularly whether or not 
figures of influence can emerge from amongst survivors) have received less attention. Therefore, 
this study proposes to explore such processes in more detail from a sample of survivors from the 
same incident (7/7). Rather than attempting to provide a detailed picture of what happened using 
data triangulated from multiple sources, which has been done elsewhere (e.g. Drury et al., 
2009b), this study proposes to explore the social influence processes underlying spontaneous co-
operation, and how it may be of use to practitioners when planning responses to mass 
emergencies.     
Therefore, the following research questions will be considered; 
A) Do emergency crowds co-operate spontaneously with each other, and is such a process 
facilitated by the emergence of influential figures from within the crowd, or do survivors respond 
in a more vulnerable way that requires outside intervention from first responders?  
 B) What are the social identification processes underlying such responses, and how do such 
processes emerge? For instance, does a common identity emerge amongst survivors that can 
explain any subsequent mutual co-operation, and will this underlie any social influence processes 
that develop?    
 
Method: 
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Events & participants  
The July 7th 2005 London bombings killed 56 people (including the four bombers), injured over 
770, and was the largest terrorist attack in the UK to date
5
. There were four different explosions 
(three on the underground tube system and one on a bus). Those in the bombed trains were not 
reached by the emergency services immediately, and were left in the dark, with little information 
about what had happened. Some waited for up to 45 minutes before the arrival of the emergency 
services, and because of the prioritization of those in more urgent need,  some of the less 
severely injured casualties were not transferred to hospital until nearly three hours after the blasts 
(Cole et al., 2011). Therefore, some survivors would have been largely responsible for each 
others’ welfare until specialized help arrived. 
 
Advertisements were carried in newspapers and a website 6 was created asking those affected 
(either as survivors or bystanders) to send their accounts, and from these respondents, twelve 
were recruited for face-to-face interviews. Because of the risk of distress occurring by asking 
participants to recount what were undoubtedly traumatic events, the following ethical safeguards 
were adopted: a) participants were interviewed at least two months after the event, so that those 
with a diagnosis of PTSD could be excluded from the study, b) informed consent was gained, 
and participants were told that the nature of the exercise was research and not therapy, and c) a 
distress protocol was followed with graded measures to manage possible distress in participants 
during the interviews. These safeguards were approved, and ethical clearance was received to 
conduct the study.    
 
Interview & analytic procedure 
Interviews took take place at a location of the participant’s choosing. They were asked to provide 
some background, and then describe the events as s/he remembered them. The rest of the 
interview was organized according to the following issues: (i) behaviour of those involved; (ii) 
participants’ thoughts and feelings; and (iii) their sense of identification with others involved in 
the incident. Interviews lasted between 45-60 minutes, and were fully transcribed, producing a 
mean of 6875 words per verbatim transcript. The analysis involved thematically coding the 
interview texts (using Miles & Huberman’s coding guidelines, 1994, p. 65) in relation to the 
issues of interest: a) instances of spontaneous mutual co-operation and whether influential 
figures emerged from the crowd who helped facilitate such co-operation, and b) whether 
survivors felt an emergent sense of shared identity with others.  
 
Results/analysis:  
Participants were sub-divided into two groups: six survivors who experienced the blasts and six 
witnesses who were not directly caught up in the blasts, but saw or heard the explosions, and saw 
others’ responses in the aftermath. A summary of their experiences is presented in the following 
table. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Insert Table 1 here  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All survivors reported feeling a strong sense of unity with those affected, but this was more 
nuanced amongst witnesses. This ranged from some (e.g. LB9) reporting a lack of collective 
identification, to others feeling an underlying sense of empathy with those affected without 
strongly identifying with them (e.g. LB3), and those who developed a growing sense of unity 
with those affected (LB2, LB6 & LB10). Furthermore, all survivors reported witnessing 
spontaneous co-operation before the emergency services arrived. However, the picture is again 
more complex with witnesses. Some (e.g. LB4 & LB9) were not close enough to the explosions 
to witness spontaneous co-operation, others (LB2) did not report spontaneous co-operation 
amongst the survivors they saw, and some (LB6 & LB10) became involved in co-operative acts 
with others to assist the evacuation or help those injured. The processes underlying how such 
unity and co-operation developed will now be explored in more depth.    
Spontaneous co-operation emerges from sense of shared fate: 
Survivors 
As found in previous research (Drury et al., 2009a&b), survivors’ experiences are consistent with 
the notion that being in emergencies can create a strong sense of shared identity which 
encourages co-operation (such as sharing information, helping casualties etc.) rather than 
apathetic and/or selfish behaviour. Furthermore, this emerged spontaneously amongst survivors 
rather than them waiting passively for outside help from emergency responders. LB1 who 
survived the Edgware Road explosion describes how co-operation emerged almost immediately 
after the blast and contrasted this with the normal selfish behaviour of rush-hour commuters in 
London; 
1. Int
7
: This helping that took place, did it happen straight after the blast or was there any delay when 
people started helping other people out? 
LB1: I’d say straight after the blast, it was almost instantaneously…8there was people just literally 
checking that the people sat next to them were ok…it was refreshing to see that the human beings that we 
are, were able to change their behaviour to the situation in hand...normal behaviour on the train at that 
time of the morning is fight, once you get your seat you put your head in the Metro newspaper and that’s it 
until you get off, but people actually interacted with each other and helped each other and were being 
considerate   
This co-operation seemed to emerge from a sense of shared identity, even amongst those who 
were caught in the most extreme situations. For instance, LB7 survived the Piccadilly Line 
explosion, and had to climb from underneath the bodies of other victims in order to escape. 
Nevertheless, she felt that a high level of unity developed straightaway, resulting in general co-
operation amongst survivors; 
2. Int: Can you remember when this sense of unity first emerged? 
                                                          
7 ‘Int:’ denotes speech by interviewer 
8 ‘…’ denotes material edited for reasons of brevity and/or clarity 
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LB7: I guess probably straight away and then it probably grew a bit but as soon as it happened and people 
were screaming there was another guy saying ‘calm down’ and people were talking to each other straight 
away and obviously something huge had happened and we just kind of instantly felt quite together  
Spontaneous co-operation may also have developed from a perceived necessity for autonomous 
action amongst survivors, as in the immediate aftermath of the explosions there was an absence 
of information from those in authority. Only one survivor (LB1) reported receiving information 
about what was happening via announcements from the train driver. Of the other survivors, four 
(LB5, LB7, LB8, & LB12) stated that they received no official information. The remaining 
survivor (LB11) was on the upstairs floor of the bus that was bombed, where it was immediately 
apparent that a bomb had exploded (news was already circulating by this point that there had 
been explosions elsewhere), and so survivors evacuated without seeking further information 
about how to act.  
Witnesses 
Feelings of shared identity and reports of spontaneous co-operation were more mixed amongst 
witnesses. For instance, LB3 was a security guard working at Kings Cross and so assisted the 
emergency services in their response. While he expressed sympathy for the victims, (and hence, 
some sense of identification with them) he also felt the need to maintain a professional distance, 
so his ability to help was not compromised: 
3.  Obviously I had to distance myself a bit because I was doing a job. But…I did feel for the 
people…sometimes I’ll take the Tube in…so I know what that part of the station looks like going down 
where the Piccadilly line is and all that, and I remember going down and the smell and the heat and seeing 
the blood on the escalators and people who weren’t so fortunate being brought up…so after that yes I did 
feel a sympathy, closer to the people who had been involved 
He later reported seeing co-operation and mutual support amongst passengers emerging from the 
escalator, suggesting a sense of shared identity amongst survivors:  
4. I was going out to the main forecourt area obviously assisting wherever I could…you would see some 
people in little groups where they’re helping each other… the ones that came up later on, when more and 
more started…coming through as a group and in a couple of them I do remember seeing, like there 
obviously was one person more distressed than the others and there would be like bonding kind of going 
on, like group therapy 
However, some witnesses did not feel a common identity with others. LB9 was in the vicinity of 
the bus bomb, and heard the explosion. Whilst he saw others communicating about what was 
going on, he also reported feeling isolated from them, as he did not feel the same sense of 
stoicism that he perceived in others, and so presumably did not identify with those who appeared 
to be adopting a calmer norm than he had expected (or was feeling himself): 
5.  A lot of people saying very normal things and um I was feeling…very anxious and quite 
panicky…bordering on the hysterical...But people seemed to be very stoical to me, which I found rather 
disconcerting...the way I felt is really just you know, to sort of run away shouting or screaming…and there 
seemed to be a lot of people that weren’t reacting that way…I thought there would have been a lot more 
general hysteria in the crowd but people seemed to be making an effort to be calm…I was looking 
at...buildings and thinking well maybe this one’s going to blow up in a minute and…there didn’t seem to be 
anybody really to share that sort of thing with in the crowd. Um so it was a bit isolating I think, quite lonely 
in a way to be in that situation. 
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Finally, there was evidence that some witnesses’ sense of collective identification changed as 
events progressed. For instance, LB6 and LB10 reported an increased sense of psychological 
identification as they both became involved in responding to the incidents. For instance, LB6 
was evacuated from the tube system near Edgware Road, but was not initially aware of the 
explosions, and so felt little common identity with others who were evacuated with him. 
However, as he approached Edgware Road above ground, he realised the seriousness of the 
situation, and became involved in helping survivors who were evacuating from the station, thus 
developing a greater sense of identification with others: 
6. Int: when you were involved in the incident around Edgware Rd did you notice any change, did you feel 
any sense of connection or unity later? 
LB6: yes, obviously…totally different set of people…you thought these people knew each other the way 
they were reacting and these people about ten minutes earlier had no idea who each other were um they 
knew that it was people that were involved in the same situation as themselves…so yes there was a 
difference and…I felt that I have something that a lot of people don’t when they travel on the tube when 
they sit there thinking you’re ignorant and I think to them- no if something does happen these people will 
react and you will work together as if you’ve known each other and that is a good feeling to have 
LB6 also mentioned that his experiences gave him an enduring sense of identification with other 
passengers since, from which he felt a sense of collective support, as he believed that in future 
emergencies he could rely upon others, which overcame popular misconceptions that commuters 
in London do not co-operate with each other.  
Inaction because of bystander apathy?  
Reports of a lack of co-operation amongst participants could suggest evidence for bystander 
apathy, if people did not spontaneously help others. However, while all participants except one 
(LB7) did report shock either in themselves or others that initially resulted in inaction, this was 
often characterized as being within individuals, and did not hinder the development of co-
operation amongst survivors. Some were so shocked they were initially unable to move, but 
rather than this contributing to general inaction, other survivors intervened and encouraged 
others to help:  
7. LB12: There was a German set of grandparents…they bought their grandson to England for a birthday treat 
and so we were talking in halting German/English…one of the other girls said she was going to pass out and I 
said no you are not you will be fine…and I did say at one point when people started to panic, saying ‘what shall 
we do’, I said ‘look we are all ok in here now so let’s just keep it that way’  
Int: Did people listen to you? 
LB12: Yeah they did…actually I think everybody was just petrified. I mean not petrified scared…but petrified 
like in stone because when we eventually came to get off, the German couple...everybody was like automatons, 
and they had two big wheelie suitcases and the little boy was trying to pull one…I said to some of the guys ‘can 
somebody help’ and they said ‘yeah of course’ and they immediately leapt in.  
For LB9 the sense of shock he experienced was reported as a possible reason for his inability to 
help others, which is perhaps conceptually different from bystander apathy (when bystanders are 
capable of helping but choose not to do so). It is also possible that this lack of co-operation could 
be related to his earlier inability to identify with others, in line Levine & Crowther’s (2008) 
evidence that bystander intervention is related to a sense of shared identity:  
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8. I came across an old woman who was just standing in the street crying and didn’t know what to 
do…thought maybe I should try to help some of these people but I can’t actually do anything 
Int:  Did you get the chance to help anybody else? 
LB9: Um not really no. And I felt a bit guilty about that actually but in hindsight I realised that I was 
probably in a bit of a state of shock and the only thing I should have done would be just to go home. 
 
Social influence:  
As well as accounts of spontaneous co-operation, some individuals emerged from amongst the 
survivors who were able to encourage further co-operation, thus counter-acting any general 
bystander apathy. For instance, LB1 describes how the ‘calm’ passengers took a lead, while 
others’ actions contributed towards a general co-operative norm, suggesting an element of social 
influence amongst survivors:   
9.  Some people took charge of the situation by looking for stuff and then other people were just looking 
after people next to them and other people were just keeping out of the way 
Int: Did you notice any particular differences between people who took charge and those that didn’t? 
LB1: the ones that took charge…seemed to be fairly calm, focused on what was happening and they 
seemed to be aware of this immediate threat to other people and they were helping people that were 
consoling other people nearby  
It is possible that if survivors were susceptible to any kind of influence (calm or otherwise), then 
they could have been influenced into a more ‘panicked’ response by less calm leadership figures. 
However, the following account shows how the influence process is more complicated than 
assuming mere susceptibility amongst survivors. LB8 describes that while she felt that people 
did need some kind of direction, they were not uncritical of all influence and they tended to 
follow the calmer leadership figure from the two different individuals who emerged amongst 
passengers in one of the train carriages caught in the explosion at King’s Cross: 
10. There was a girl who turned out to be a solicitor…standing on the seats and saying “right everybody 
don’t panic, it’s going to be all right, we don’t know what’s happened but people know we’re here…they 
will come and get us…let’s all keep calm”…this woman who was trying to direct things was keeping people 
safe… 
 There was a stupid man…who also thought he was very self important. The other woman was just good at 
taking control and calm people down, keeping a calm atmosphere, and he was going ‘we’ve got to get out 
of here!’ 
Int: Did you notice any difference in the way people listened to either of them, were people following their 
directions equally, or one more than the other? 
LB8: I think people seemed to be glad that there was somebody like the lawyer woman taking some kind of 
control…I think people looked to that…and she had a good strong voice, she was sensible, she commanded 
some kind of respect and authority if you like and what she was saying was very sensible so people were 
taking note…the bloke he was just a bit of a pompous ass and I don’t think people were really taking much 
notice of him  
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Discussion: 
The evidence presented from survivors and witnesses of 7/7 suggests that people were able to co-
operate spontaneously in the immediate aftermath of the explosions, and popular assumptions of 
crowd vulnerability in emergencies (mass panic or bystander apathy) were not supported. This 
was attributed to the emergence of a common identity that encouraged resilient and co-operative 
behaviour, as opposed to the selfish and competitive behaviour that a vulnerable framework 
would predict. It also appears that figures of influence emerged, who then had a positive effect 
on the general co-operation to help others. Therefore, assumptions that those in emergencies will 
either be too shocked or panic-stricken to follow advice, or that they will be susceptible to all 
social influence, are not supported.  
However, it is also worth considering that the resilient approach does not assume that all those 
affected in emergencies will necessarily behave heroically, as actions of exceptional bravery by 
individuals who may risk their own safety to help others, are by definition rare. It is more that 
mundane acts of social cohesion (Drury, 2011) in emergencies (such as comforting others, not 
getting in the way of others helping, etc) allow brave individuals to emerge from this cooperative 
norm who can then exert social influence to encourage more pro-active co-operation amongst 
survivors. Overall, then, the data seems to support a resilience rather than a vulnerability 
approach to crowd behaviour in emergencies, but before discussing the implications of these 
findings, it is first necessary to explore possible limitations with this study.  
Possible limitations: 
Methodological constraints mean that the data presented in this study need to be treated with 
some caution. Firstly, participant recruitment was vulnerable to possible self-selection bias, in 
that those who did not feel a sense of unity or cooperation with other survivors may have been 
more reluctant to be interviewed. It is also possible that reports by survivors of life-threatening 
emergencies may be susceptible to bias in self-presentation demands, in that they may not be 
willing to disclose information that may present them in a negative light (e.g. if they behaved 
selfishly towards others). However, participants did not report selfish behaviour in others either 
(which would have been less susceptible to self-presentation bias), which is consistent with other 
research in this area (e.g. Drury et al, 2009a&b). Many of the participants also spontaneously 
mentioned phenomena (such as a sense of shared unity and co-operation) before being asked by 
the interviewer, giving us more confidence that the results are robust. Finally, there is a potential 
limitation concerning our analysis, in that we must be careful not to make claims that go beyond 
the data presented, as they were from a small sub-set of participants affected by the same 
incident (Drury et al., 2009b provide data from a wider set of sources that comprised an 
estimated 5% of those affected by 7/7). This may limit the generalisability of our findings. While 
we are confident that our findings illustrate the possible social influence processes found in a 
particular mass emergency, more research into how social identification and influence processes 
develop in other mass incidents (such as at sport events or music festivals) would be welcome.  
There are also theoretical reasons for treating the data presented in this study with caution. The 
reasons for the relative effectiveness of the social influence reported amongst bystanders are 
more speculative. It is possible that the emergent figures of influence encouraged what appeared 
to be in-group normative behaviour (e.g. calm rather than ‘panicked’ behaviour), and so were 
more effective in influencing others, because they were seen as prototypical of the in-group. The 
11 
 
Social Identity Theory of leadership (Hogg, 2001; Hogg & Van Knippenberg, 2003) suggests 
that as a group’s social identity grows and people identify more strongly with their in-group, then 
they are more aware of the group prototype to which they should adhere. Those that are seen as 
more prototypical of that group will then be seen as influential by other in-group members, and 
so have the ability to become effective leaders.  Therefore, it is possible that those who emerged 
as potential figures of influence amongst survivors were successful in influencing others if they 
shared the prototypical values of the group norm that developed (e.g. calm and co-operative, as 
opposed to ‘panicked’ and selfish). However, the evidence for the prototypicality of such 
influence is patchy, and so the conclusions drawn here are tentative and in need of further 
empirical study. 
Implications: 
This study adds to a growing body of evidence (e.g. Drury, 2011) that supports the Social 
Identity Model of Collective Resilience, and has practical implications for the safe management 
of mass emergencies. For instance, if emergency planners hold irrationalist and/or paternalistic 
views of crowds, then this could lead to the conclusion that they cannot be trusted in 
emergencies and therefore need shepherding away from danger in a non-participatory and 
perhaps even authoritarian way. This could lead to the perception that crowds in emergencies are 
a potential public order problem (resulting in more coercive forms of crowd management), rather 
than as potential partners in enabling successful mass evacuations. Neglecting the potential 
spontaneous resilience of crowds in emergencies by the authorities could also be missing out on an 
opportunity to make use of a positive resource. The ability of people in emergencies to exert social 
influence and co-ordinate mutual aid amongst survivors should not be underestimated, and there is 
evidence that this notion has already been incorporated into some international emergency response 
strategies. For instance the Israeli ambulance service distributes first aid kits in the immediate 
aftermath of suicide bombings, so that uninjured bystanders can use them to assist casualties 
(Cole, 2010). Therefore, rather than seeing the public as potential obstructions that need to be moved 
on, acknowledging and making provision for people’s willingness to help and direct others could 
provide the emergency services with a large pool of potential volunteers, who can act as a ‘force 
multiplier’ (Cole et al., 2011, p.363) so the professional first responders can focus on more 
specialised tasks. In short, rather than the crowd in an emergency being seen as ‘part of the 
problem’, perhaps it should be viewed as ‘part of the solution’ (Cole et al., 2011). Developing this 
concept, and exploring how to facilitate the development of shared identities can also play a part in 
further mitigating the impacts of future mass emergencies by encouraging the ability of people to 
help each other in times of adversity.   
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Table 1   
Participant Location Survivor/ 
witness 
High/Low ID? Spontaneous 
co-operation? 
LB1  
(male, late 20s) 
Edgware 
Road 
Survivor High  Yes 
LB2  
(female, late 20s) 
Tavistock 
Square 
Witness Initially low but grows over 
time 
No 
LB3  
(male early 30s) 
Kings Cross Witness Low (but some sense of 
empathy with others) 
Yes 
LB4 
(male early 40s) 
Tavistock 
Square   
Witness Low (but some sense of 
empathy with others) 
n/a 
LB5 
(female, mid 50s) 
Aldgate Survivor High  Yes 
LB6  
(male, late 20s) 
Edgware 
Road 
Witness Initially low, but becomes 
high 
Yes 
LB7 
(female mid 20s) 
Kings Cross Survivor High  Yes 
LB8 
(female, mid 50s) 
Kings Cross Survivor High  Yes 
LB9 
(male, early 40s) 
Tavistock 
Square   
Witness Low n/a 
LB10 
(male, mid 20s) 
Kings Cross Witness Medium Yes 
LB11 
(female, mid 40s) 
Tavistock 
Square   
Survivor High  Yes 
LB12 
(female, early 50s) 
Aldgate Survivor High Yes 
 
